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[As recipient o f the Law Faculty Teaching Award, Dr. McCallum was asked to give 
a talk on teaching, which she delivered to colleagues and students during Speakers' 
Hour on 17 February 2011. Below is the text o f the talk, revised to incorporate some 
o f the comments from those present. Sources referred to are listed in the Suggestions 
for Further Reading, below.]
Thank you to all of you who were part of naming me as the first recipient of 
the Law Faculty Teaching Award. I feel privileged to have the job that I have and I 
am glad that you think that I do it well enough to deserve a teaching award. What 
follows are some of my observations about first year law. These are my observations 
but they are not uniquely mine, nor are they new. Duncan Kennedy, for example, 
offered similar observations in an article entitled "Legal Education as Training for 
Hierarchy". First published in 1982, this article is still a depressingly accurate and 
apt critique of the law school enterprise. (See the Appendix, below.)
Most Anglophone common law degree programs in the USA and Canada 
offer a compulsory first year curriculum that has changed very little since 
universities began offering a professional law degree program. The courses offered 
in first year deal primarily with private law. At UNB, three of the five full-year 
courses in first year — property, contracts, and torts — are private law courses which 
have been part of the first year curriculum since the school was established in Saint 
John in 1892. Currently, we allocate more class hours to these three courses than do 
most other Canadian law schools, but property, contracts, and torts are a substantial 
part of the required first year curriculum in all of the common law degree programs 
in Canada. Windsor offers a slight variation, with torts a compulsory course in 
second year. At the new law schools to be established at Thompson Rivers and at 
Lakehead, property, contracts, and torts will be a major element of the compulsory 
first year curriculum.
There is considerable agreement, too, about how to organize the first year 
private law courses. For the property course, instructors in Canadian law faculties 
have a choice of three national casebooks. Each presents property law primarily as a 
mechanism for facilitating individual decisions about the use of assets, and for 
resolving disputes between individuals about which of them has a better claim to the 
use of a particular asset. In the make-believe world of property law, all the players
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own property and all property owners are treated as juridical equals by the court — 
equally able to acquire property and equally able to defend their property rights.
Property law does not concern itself with those who do not own property, 
and are therefore excluded from participation in decisions about the allocation and 
exercise of private property rights. Thus, property law can ignore the grossly unequal 
distribution of wealth in Canada. It can also ignore uses of property that damage the 
environment or waste natural resources, unless these uses can be challenged within 
the narrow confines of common law protection of individual property rights, such as 
the rights of riparian owners.
Contracts is also about juridical equals making choices about how to use 
assets, and making agreements with others in order to implement those choices. Law 
will enforce these agreements but will not regulate their content. Occasionally, 
equity may intervene in individual cases where one party takes undue advantage of 
the other. Remember Old Herbert Bundy of Yew Tree Farm in Broadchalke, "one of 
the most pleasing villages in England"? Lord Denning intervened to prevent Lloyds 
Bank from evicting Mr. Bundy, because in the circumstances it would be 
"unconscionable" for the Bank to exercise its legal rights. But cases that merit 
intervention are treated as anomalies. As Lord Denning observed: "No bargain will 
be upset which is the result of the ordinary interplay of forces.. . .  Take the case of a 
poor man who is homeless. He agrees to pay a high rent to a landlord just to get a 
roof over his head. The common law will not interfere. It is left to Parliament. Next 
take the case of a borrower in urgent need of money. He borrows it from the bank at 
high interest and it is guaranteed by a friend. The guarantor gives his bond and gets 
nothing in return. The common law will not interfere." {Lloyd's Bank v Bundy, 
[1975] QB 326 (CA)at334).
Contracts courses do not pay much attention to statutory limitations on 
freedom of contract, such as minimum wage legislation or consumer protection 
legislation, that challenge the idea that the world is inhabited by juridical equals with 
the freedom to make the bargain that best suits them. In the make-believe world of 
contracts cases, there are no structural inequalities between, for example, employer 
and employee, manufacturer and consumer, or lender and necessitous borrower.
Torts courses, too, focus on disputes between juridical equals, but in non­
contractual, non-consensual relationships, and on the common law remedies for loss 
or damage suffered in these relationships. In torts as in contracts, students learn that 
the law does not impose liability in the absence of an intentional act (the intentional 
torts). Even when the cause of action is negligence, the underlying theory is that 
actors are presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of not acting with the 
care that is appropriate in the circumstances. First year torts courses pay little 
attention to areas of law where these basic principles have proved inadequate as a
mechanism for dealing with harm inflicted on others. There is little attention, for 
example, to statutory compensation schemes, such as compensation for workplace 
injuries, or no-fault auto insurance, where legislatures have intervened when the 
divergence between popular understandings of justice and common law tort 
principles became too great to be ignored.
In giving so much weight to property, contracts, and torts in first year, we 
give the message that law exists to enforce those obligations that people choose for 
themselves, but not to impose obligations. Thus, if workers want to work in unsafe 
factories, they should be free to make that choice, and the owner of the factory 
should not be liable to them if their choice turns out badly. We give the message, too, 
that individuals all have the same freedom to choose, and that law should not 
intervene to regulate the choices except in rare cases of unconscionability. We 
behave like some kind of peculiar anarchists, who, like other anarchists, are 
suspicious of the state, but who, unlike other anarchists, celebrate private property 
and the freedom of individuals to use it as they choose. This suspicion of the state 
also informs the public law courses that are often offered in first year: in both 
constitutional and criminal law, the state is the adversary.
Common law faculties not only offer much the same curriculum in first 
year; they also use the same basic teaching method -  the case method. In the case 
method, most of the assigned readings are extracts from judges' reasons for decision, 
primarily at the appellate level, and most of the class time, whether the instructor 
lectures or directs a class discussion, is dedicated to extracting the legal principles 
from the cases. In theory, in the back and forth of a good class, students engage in 
the same sort of reasoning by analogy that is modelled for them in well-written 
reasons for decision. Students state the facts of the dispute under consideration, and 
then make an argument in support of a particular outcome, equating the facts under 
consideration to, or distinguishing them from, prior authoritative cases.
The invention of the case method is usually attributed to Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, who introduced it at Harvard Law School shortly after the end 
of the American Civil War. Thus, here we are, in the words of Edward Rubin, former 
Dean of Vanderbilt School of Law, ". . . at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
using a model of legal education th a t. . . treats the entire twentieth century as little 
more than a passing annoyance."
What accounts for the longevity of the case method? First, for Langdell, the 
case method was an inexpensive way to create reading materials for students in the 
absence of the shelves of weighty treatises and texts on American law available to 
today's instructors. This practical consideration remains pertinent. It is easier to 
create casebooks than to write texts, and cheaper, too; instructors can compile
collections of cases from public sources without having to pay significant copyright 
fees.
Secondly, the focus on reading cases is an important part of student 
immersion (some might say indoctrination) in the culture of the law. Reading cases 
is different from what most law students did as undergraduates, although those who 
read Chaucer's Canterbury Tales or Dickens’ novels may experience occasional 
flashbacks. Thus, the case method confirms law students in their sense that they are 
joining an exclusive and elite profession, and that they are being introduced into the 
"mysteries of the law".
Thirdly, the case method is an effective way to teach students to reason and 
argue in ways that are distinctive to legal profession. At least that is the conclusion 
of a 2007 study on legal education in the United States funded by the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Learning -  a conclusion that seems plausible, 
notwithstanding faculty despair during moot season over written and oral arguments 
organized around a few cases that popped up when students typed a word or two 
from their case facts into the search engine for a case database.
Why, then, would I criticize a method of instruction that accomplishes what 
my colleagues and I regard as one of the main goals of the first year program — 
teaching students the much-mentioned but seldom-explained technique of thinking 
like a lawyer? In my view, over-reliance on the case method of instruction, combined 
with the curricular emphasis on private law, fosters a narrow and circumscribed 
understanding of what lawyers do, and discourages any awkward questions about the 
connection between law and justice.
Students who come to law school thinking that they will acquire knowledge 
and skills that might help them to change the world are not wrong to think that, but 
they are likely to be disheartened by the first year program. Diligent students invest a 
great deal of time and anxious effort in learning how to read cases and how to think 
like a lawyer, only to grapple with questions such as the difference, if any, between a 
gift of Blackacre to A & B so long as they supports their parents, a gift of Blackacre 
to A & B providing that they support their parents, and a gift of Blackacre to A & B 
in the hope that they will support their parents.
Let me be clear. I am proud to teach in a faculty that defines our mission as 
preparing students for the practice of law -  and woe betide students who do not sort 
out the legal meaning of the various arcane terms used to create interests in property. 
We need to prepare our graduates for the practice of law in all of its variety, on Bay 
Street, Wall Street or in "The City" as London calls itself, in small firms serving the 
local community, in legal aid clinics, government, business, non-governmental
organizations (NGOS), unions, and elsewhere. The first year emphasis on the case 
method and private law is the wrong introduction to legal learning, not just for those 
who want to make a better world, but also for those who want a world where markets 
rule.
Reading appellate decisions to find legal principles reinforces the erroneous 
perception that real law (the law that matters) is found in judges' decisions on the 
common law, with equity and legislation appearing in minor roles supporting, 
supplementing and occasionally perfecting the common law, that is, making it more 
perfect — an interesting concept. Reading cases does not adequately prepare students 
to advise clients on rights that are created by statutes and interpreted by 
administrative tribunals. Instructors may remind students that the legislature is 
supreme, but when the assigned reading material is predominantly cases, students 
tend to look to case law, not statutes, for first principles. The focus on identifying 
and understanding leading cases reinforces students’ inclination to look to the 
common law for solutions for their clients, and does not help students to imagine 
new ways of thinking about clients' questions and concerns.
Even when the first year courses deal with principles embodied in 
legislation, such as the Criminal Code, limitations of actions acts, or the Charter, 
instructors use case analysis as the method of instruction, with the alarming 
consequence that, for example, students who might know the ratio of cases that 
explicate s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may not know what s. 35 says, and 
students taking statute-based courses in upper years complain to the instructor about 
having to read legislation rather than cases.
In the past few years, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada has looked 
at various aspects of professional legal training. A FLSC Task Force on the Common 
Law Degree recommended that by 2015, applicants applying for bar admission 
anywhere in Canada must be able to demonstrate certain competencies, which 
include having the ability to "identify and evaluate the appropriateness o f alternatives 
for resolution of the issue or dispute". (See the Appendix, below). The case method 
suggests that law is about appellate adjudication, rather than about alternatives to 
adjudication.
In the process of extracting abstract principles from case narratives of 
individual disputes, students learn three important lessons about how to simplify the 
world. They learn to transform plaintiffs and defendants, whatever the power 
relations between them, into juridical equals, and to transform multifaceted disputes 
into limited legal questions to be resolved by a judge. They learn, too, to transform 
individual judges, whatever their strengths and weaknesses, into the anonymous, 
neutral and authoritative "court". In this simplified world, where case outcomes are 
the result of the application of neutral legal principles by neutral decision-makers,
there is no basis for complaining if the outcome seems unjust, as long as it comports 
with sound legal reasoning. If you ask a judge to answer a narrow legal question, it 
does not lie in your mouth (as an equity lawyer might say) to complain if you get, 
not justice, but an answer to the question that you asked.
A judge may feel that the outcome is not entirely satisfactory, as evaluated 
against standards of efficiency, rationality, justice, or some other ideal that the judge 
holds dear, and may conclude the reasons for decision by calling on the legislature 
for a solution. That may be appropriate; if judges violate principles of legal 
reasoning to achieve a just outcome for subjectively deserving parties in individual 
cases, there will be no pressure on the legislature to enact legislation to deal with 
what is likely a more pervasive problem. Law schools, though, should not be in the 
business of encouraging law students to check their sense of justice at the door.
I am not suggesting that we jettison the trinity of property, contracts, and 
torts. I agree with the FLSC Task Force that law students need to understand the 
"foundational legal principles that apply to private relationships, including contracts, 
torts and property law". But students also need to understand how the world in which 
they will earn their living differs from the world of property, contracts, and torts 
casebooks. They need to develop proficiency in oral and written communication, and 
in listening empathetically and thinking creatively. They need skills in research, 
synthesis, and problem-solving. Surely we can teach students to think like lawyers 
without leaving them, in the words of one student, silent, frustrated and 
"disenfranchised by our sheer lack of knowledge."
In 2009, Harvard Law School, home of the case method, introduced two 
new courses for the compulsory first year program, one in legislation and regulation, 
and the other chosen from among several foundational courses on international or 
comparative law. Future Harvard students will also take a problem-solving course in 
which they will learn to think creatively and to draw from a variety of resources in 
dealing with questions a lawyer might encounter in practice. To make room in the 
schedule for these additions, Harvard cut one credit hour from each of its traditional 
first year courses — property, contracts, torts, criminal law and civil procedure — 
which are now offered as four-credit hour courses, as they are at many Canadian law 
schools. We, too, should consider whether we have made the best choices about what 
we offer in first year.
In the 21st century, human beings face unprecedented challenges, including 
climate change, the so-called war on terror, the growing gap between rich and poor, 
the claims of indigenous peoples worldwide for recognition of their rights to land 
and self-government, the transfer of power from democratic governments to 
privately-owned corporations through multilateral trade agreements, and a myriad 
others. Lawyers will be in the forefront of responding to these challenges. To
adequately prepare our graduates for their responsibilities in the 21st century, we 
need to free the first year curriculum from the constraints of the case method and the 
hegemony of private law principles.
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Appendix: "Recommendations", Federation of Law Societies of Canada: Task Force 
on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Final Report, October 2009, 7-12, 
<http://www.flsc.ca/en/pdFCommonLawDegreeReport.pdf>.
1. The Task Force recommends that the law societies in common law jurisdictions in 
Canada adopt forthwith a uniform national requirement for entry to their bar 
admission programs (“national requirement”).
4. The Task Force recommends that the following constitute the national 
requirement:
An applicant fo r entry to a bar admission program ("the applicant") must satisfy the 
competency requirements by either,
a. successful completion o f an LL.B. or J.D. degree that has been accepted by the 
Federation o f  Law Societies o f Canada ("the Federation ”); or
b. possessing a Certificate o f  Qualification from the Federation’s National 
Committee on Accreditation.
B. Competency Requirements
1. Skills Competencies
The applicant must have demonstrated the following competencies:
1.1 Problem-Solving
In solving legal problems, the applicant must have demonstrated the ability to,
a. identify relevant facts;
b. identify legal, practical, and policy issues and conduct the necessary research 
arising from those issues;
c. analyze the results o f research;
d. apply the law to the facts; and
e. identify and evaluate the appropriateness o f  alternatives fo r resolution o f the issue 
or dispute.
1.2 Legal Research
The applicant must have demonstrated the ability to,
a. identify legal issues;
b. select sources and methods and conduct legal research relevant to Canadian law;
c. use techniques o f  legal reasoning and argument, such as case analysis and 
statutory interpretation, to analyze legal issues;
d. identify, interpret and apply results o f  research; and
e. effectively communicate the results o f  research.
1.3 Oral and Written Legal Communication
The applicant must have demonstrated the ability to,
a. communicate clearly in the English or French language;
b. identify the purpose o f  the proposed communication;
c. use correct grammar, spelling and language suitable to the purpose o f  the 
communication and for its intended audience; and
d. effectively formulate and present well reasoned and accurate legal argument, 
analysis, advice or submissions.
2. Ethics and Professionalism
The applicant must have demonstrated an awareness and understanding o f  the 
ethical requirements for the practice o f law in Canada, including,
a. the duty to communicate with civility;
b. the ability to identify and address ethical dilemmas in a legal context;
c. familiarity with the general principles o f ethics and professionalism applying to 
the practice o f law in Canada, including those related to,
i. circumstances that give rise to ethical problems;
ii. the fiduciary nature o f  the lawyer's relationship with the client;
iii. conflicts o f interest;
iv. duties to the administration o f  justice;
v. duties relating to confidentiality and disclosure;
vi. an awareness o f the importance ofprofessionalism in dealing with clients, other 
counsel, judges, court staff and members o f  the public; and
vii. the importance and value o f  serving and promoting the public interest in the 
administration o f  justice.
3. Substantive Legal Knowledge
The applicant must have undertaken a sufficiently comprehensive program o f  study 
to obtain an understanding o f the complexity o f the law and the interrelationship 
between different areas o f  legal knowledge. In the course o f this program o f study 
the applicant must have demonstrated a general understanding o f the core legal 
concepts applicable to the practice o f law in Canada, including as a minimum the 
following areas:
3.1 Foundations o f  Law
The applicant must have an understanding o f the foundations o f law, including,
a. principles o f common law and equity;
b. the process o f  statutory construction and analysis; and
c. the administration o f  the law in Canada.
3.2 Public Law o f  Canada
The applicant must have an understanding o f the core principles o f public law in 
Canada, including,
a. the constitutional law o f Canada, including federalism and the distribution o f 
legislative powers, the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, human rights principles and 
the rights o f Aboriginal peoples o f Canada;
b. Canadian criminal law; and
c. the principles o f  Canadian administrative law.
3.3 Private Law Principles
The applicant must demonstrate an understanding o f the foundational legal 
principles that apply to private relationships, including,
a. contracts, torts and property law; and
b. legal and fiduciary concepts in commercial relationships.
